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Abstract 
      We study the influence of product market competition forms on the first-price sealed auction and the 
English ascending auction with independent cost types. Bidders, valuing the license basing on the 
information released in the first stage license bidding game and the possible game they will play in the 
product market, care about not only whether they can win and thus how much to bid, but also the 
information released in the auction when they win. As in the English ascending auction, all bidders are 
able to constantly adjust their belief about their potential rival’s cost distribution, and the higher the bid 
goes, the lower the potential rival’s cost, the lower the expected gain from winning a license, thus bidders 
will keep downgrade the value of license and bid more conservatively and the government will generate 
lower expected revenue from the English auction than in first-price sealed auction. In particular, if the 
government uses the English ascending auction while the Bertrand price-cutting game being played in the 
product market, then all bidders except the two lowest cost type bidder will quit the bidding game 
sequentially and the expected revenue will be close to zero. Furthermore, as the Bertrand competition is 
more intensive than the Cournot competition, the government’s expected revenue is lower when the 
product market game played as a Bertrand game.   
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The past few years have seen the big roles played by economic analyses in many cases. 
FCC spectrum auction and the recent European 3G mobile license auction raised 
people’s great interest in auction theory and their application to the practical auction 
design issues. Many works have been done to study and evaluate the auction scheme 
proposed by theorists. Recently, auction theorists’ interests have shifted to multi-object 
endogenous value model, largely due to the 3G license auction issue. In the classical 
auction model, it is usually assumed that all bidders’ value are exogenously given, 
which implies all bidders know their valuations of objects and they cannot adjust their 
valuations of objects and that the auction is a one-shot game. There is no strategic 
behavior that can affect their valuation of objects, neither pre-auction nor post-auction. 
However, this is clearly not the case in license auction and procurement contracting.  
 
In license auctions, designers have to consider not only how to sell these licenses, but 
also what kind of impact the selling scheme has on the valuation of the licenses to 
potential buyers. In particular, a license auction is essentially a dynamic game. On the 
one hand, when attending the bidding game, all potential buyers have to consider how 
much to pay, given their belief of likely final product market competition if they win. 
On the other hand, they have to take account of the fact that how much they bid in the 
license auction will inevitably reveal information about their types (cost or capital 
ability) and how this information will change competitors’ belief about other bidders’ 
types, thus change the game they are going to play. A rational player in this game must 
be able to look forward and backward consistently. 
 
This kind two-way interaction is a common phenomenon in many situations. We can 
easily observe these phenomena in many industries such as the transportation industry, 
the telecommunication industry and the banking industry. In the transportation industry,   3 
government or its agency (industry regulator) usually issues more than one license to 
enhance the competition. For example, there are currently two companies providing 
coaches services between Oxford and London.  Obviously, if the government issues 
more than two licenses, then the licenses’ valuations will be much lower and make 
potential bidders bid more conservatively in license bidding game. Same things happen 
to the telecommunication and the water industry. How to take this factor into account 
and design a good selling scheme, while a lot of other things to be considered, is vital to 
the success of public policy. 
 
 Myerson’s path-breaking work ( Myerson (1981)) contains the seeds of endogenous 
determined value problem, yet few noticed this point. Probably shadowed by Myerson’s 
optimal design result which has great generality and the methodology merits, the quality 
uncertainty issue raised in this paper has unfortunately failed to attract much attention. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) studied an affiliated value model in which the winning 
bidder’s payoff may depend upon his personal preferences and the preferences of his 
opponents. The basic result of this model is that an English auction generates higher 
expected revenue than does a second-price auction, which in turn dominates the Dutch 
auction and first-price sealed bid auction. The intuition is straightforward. In the English 
auction with affiliation value, higher opponents’ bid means higher value of the object, 
which makes all bidders update upward their valuation of the object. This process is 
essentially a process of information release which reduces winners’ curse phenomenon 
thus makes the English auction superior to other auction formats. 
 
The affiliation assumption plays a key role in deriving this revenue ranking. If one 
bidder’s good news is bad news for his opponents, then this conclusion will hold no 
longer. This is exactly the case we will consider in the next chapter. The point is, if 
higher bids submitted by opponents are signals bad news to all other bidders, then they 
will adjust downward their valuation of the objects and thus bid more conservatively. As 
the English auction enables all bidders to update their belief, while first-price sealed   4 
auction cannot, thus first-price sealed auction will generate higher expected revenue for 
sellers. 
 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) studied an auction whose outcome affects the future 
interaction among bidders. The point in their work is that in the case of externality, 
bidders’ bidding behaviors will be adjusted accordingly, depending on whether the 
externality is positive or negative. They build up a single-object auction model in which 
allocating the object to a buyer will induce externality to other potential buyers. As this 
kind externality can be either positive or negative, it is unclear which auction format 
will be better. The point of value in this paper is the impact of externality on bidders’ 
strategy behavior.  
 
However, they ignored the fact that in many cases, the bids at the auction can serve as 
signals that will influence beliefs in the post-bid interaction, which will be studied here 
in the next chapter. Another question in this paper is that they consider only the single-
object auction rather than the multiple-object auction, which is more important to 
understand license auction and more related to externality.  
 
Other studies on externalities are Krishna (1993; Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996); Jehiel, 
Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996). The theme of these studies is all bidders’ willingness 
to pay for the objects depend on how they anticipate the allocation of other objects and 
who will win the objects. The term endogenous valuations come from the fact that 
bidders’ valuations are determined endogenously from the post-bid market interaction, 
which depends on the post-bid market and information structure, thus post-bid behavior 
and performance. We will discuss these problems in the following section. 
 
Another problem related to multi-object auction is the post-bid market structure. While 
the studies of industrial organization (IO) and auction theory have made great advances   5 
in the past thirty years due to the development of game theory, the marriage of IO and 
auction theory is still in its early stage
12.  
 
In the monopoly case, this problem is relatively simple. As issuing a monopolist license 
is essentially equivalent to auction a single object valued by different bidders with 
signals drawn independently from assumed identical assumption, most of results for IPV 
model and Common value model can be carried over here directly. In particular, the 
efficient allocation requirement is easily satisfied. However, for the revenue ranking, as 
the value  of a monopoly license essentially depends on the market demand and the 
winner’s operating cost, so the value of monopoly license contains both private and 
common value factors, we would not be surprise if we find out that an ascending 
English auction generates higher revenue than the first-price sealed bid auction does 
Milgrom and Weber (1982).  
 
In the multi-license case, things become much more complicated. This point can be seen 
clearly from the European 3G license auction. Most of countries issued more than one 
license. At the same time, there exist incumbent operatorsin all these countries. Another 
point worthy mentioned here is that entering into this market usually requires huge sunk 
cost investment, which restricts the government or regulators’ ability to enhance 
                                                 
1 However, this does not mean that economists failed to see this point and its importance. In an influential 
paper, Demsetz (1968) discusses nicely the possibility of using auction to substitute for regulating utilities 
that are seen as natural monopoly industry then. The insight in this paper is that, even the utilities industry 
has monopoly characteristics; the government still does not need to regulate this kind of monopoly 
industry. Instead, government can introduce competition into this monopoly industry by holding a 
monopoly license auction.  
 
2  Recently held license auctions in Europe proved the importance of IO issues in designing auction 
schemes. Klemperer (2002), Binmore and Klemperer (2002) gave detailed expositions of how IO issues 
affect the auction design.  
   6 
competition by issuing as many license as possible
3. This point is explained and 
examined in  Jehiel and Moldovanu (2002). They find that the bidding among 
incumbents displays ‘war of attrition’ features’.
4 If only one license is licensed, then war 
of attrition may lead to the entry. Contrary to common sense, this features will be 
alleviated if several licenses are auctioned, resulting in less entry. In particular, if the 
number of license is equal to the number of incumbent, then each of them can purchase 
one license and thus block new entry completely. Related evidence can be found in 
Klemperer (2002). 
 
A corollary deduced from the result above is that auctioning the maximum possible 
number of licenses need not induce a higher degree of competitiveness. Restricting 
supply is a way to combat tacit collusion and to induce more entry. Another possibility 
is introducing supply uncertainty about the number of licenses to encourage entry. The 
Germany 3G license auction scheme can be regarded as a variant of this possibility. 
However, many economists criticized this scheme as it provided many chances for 
bidders to collude. (see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001); Klemperer (2002)) 
 
Their analysis also point out that the induced entry and revenue obtained in various 
auction formats crucially depends on the relation between the number of incumbents 
and the number of auctioned licenses. Furthermore, the competitiveness and revenue 
may be either positively or negatively correlated, depending upon the setting we are 
considering. 
 
All these point to the necessity of further study of auction design and bidding behavior. 
In particular, the interdependence of valuations and the post-bid market competition 
deserve our careful consideration. In the next chapter, we will study the possible affect 
of the post-bid market interaction on the bidders’ bidding behavior and thus the auction 
choice. 
                                                 
3 Duplication of sunk cost in the same industry will inevitably give rise to welfare loss, which should be 
traded off with the welfare imp rovement induced by introducing competition. 
4 For the war of attrition, please see Fudenberg (1991), page 216-219; Bishop (1978); and Bulow (1999).   7 
 
This paper focuses on the interplay between license auction and market competition 
from an information perspective. As license auctions essentially evolve multi-stage 
game among all bidders, from incumbents to potential entrants and license winners. Not 
only have the bidders (firms) to decide how much to bid in the license auction game, but 
also what kind of game they are going to play in the final product market (if they win). 
When they decide how much to bid for the license, they should take the following 
factors into account: 
 
1.Different auction forms adopted in the first stage game will reveal different 
information to license winners (and losers, but they are not relevant any more in the 
product market), thus affect their expected profit in the second stage product market 
competition. 
 
2. Different games played in the second stage product market competition will result in 
different expected profit, thus affect their valuations of license and their bidding 
behaviors in the first stage license auction game. 
 
3. As bidders’ valuations of licenses are based mainly on their market share size and 
efficiency factors (costs of providing service in the final market),their biddings are 
strategic substitute, as higher biddings offered by rivals means their servicing cost is low 
thus will lower bidders’ valuations of license. So bidding process is in fact an 
information revelation process. 
 
Combined consideration of the factors  above implies government may prefer one 
auction form to another one, depending on the game played in the product market. 
 
The key point in this story is that, if players are strategic and fully rational, then when 
they bid for the licenses, they should take into account not only how much to pay, but   8 
also how much they can get if they win the licenses. Only by taking both effects into 
account then can we tell a good story about license auctions. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section one is an introduction, I briefly explain the 
characteristics of license auction and some facts which have been widely observed in 
the recently held European 3G license auction. We set up a simple model in the section 
two. Section three is the analysis of the model. As the post-bid competition may be of 
many kind forms, we have to distinguish them and see if this difference will influence 
our result or not. In particular, we discuss two representative cases respectively. We first 
discuss the case when post-bid game is played as a Cournot quantity game, and then we 
will discuss the case when post-bid game is played as a Bertrand price competition. We 
find out that if the post-bid competition is the Bertrand game, then a first-price sealed 
bid auction generate higher expected revenue for the government than does an English 
ascending auction. In the Bertrand price competition, we also get a rather extraordinary 
result, which is similar to the toehold effect (Bulow, Huang et al. (1999)). However, if 
the post-bid competition is the Cournot game, the revenue comparison is not clear, 
though we have proved that the symmetric solution is unique. 
 
Section four focuses on the efficiency problem. As entering utilities industry usually 
requires huge sunk-cost investment and the cost structure of utilities industry is usually 
characterized by the high fixed cost and low marginal cost, we will study their impacts 
on the license auction and the action the seller may take when he cares for the 
efficiency. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an industry in which only two firms can survive due to market size or 
technology constraints. The government decides to issue entry permit by holding a   9 
license auction
5. This is essentially a two-stage game. In the first-stage game, the 
government, who cares about revenue, chooses either an ascending English auction or a 
first-price sealed bid auction to sell 2 licenses
6. All potential buyers, labeled 
{ } 1,, iNn ˛=L , decide how much to bid basing on their expected profit, which 
depends on their costs, here their types, and the game they are going to play in the 
product market, if they win the license; and 2 license-winners enter into the final 
market. In the second stage, 2 license-winners compete with each other by playing the 
Cournot quantity or the Bertrand price competition. Bidders’ costs are drawn 
independently from the identical, continuous uniform distribution, i.e.  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ i c  for any 
bidder  N i˛ .,  
 
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1 : Government (the seller) is risk-neutral and aims to raise as much 
revenue as possible from selling licenses. 
 
Remark: Theoretically, the government should be benevolent and cares the weighted 
sum of consumer surplus and firms’ (here the bidders) surplus. But in the real world, 
this consideration may not work very well, as government usually hire its agent to sell 
the license and agents’ reward will be based on their performance which is related to the 
auction result. Thus, even the government is benevolent; the agent may care only for the 
revenue.  
 
Assumption 2: Each bidder has a unit demand. And all licenses are homogenous. The 
services they may provide in the final market are also homogenous. 
                                                 
5 Of course, the government can allocate license by beauty contest. However, the France experience 
shows that it is not a good way to either allocate license or raise money. French telecommunication 
regulator, after the British and Germany license auction, decided to set a price for each of four licenses 
rather than to hold an auction. It turned out only two firms paid the price and got license, two other license 
remained unsold. 
6 Whether two or more licenses being sold is not important here. The important thing here is that there 
exists competition between winners, i.e., winners have to play another game after winning the license.   10 
 
Remark:  This is plausible due to the following two reasons. Firstly, to enhance 
competition, the government may wish to restrict each bidder to hold only one license at 
most. Secondly, due to capacity constraint or other reasons, any potential services 
provider is unable to operate more than one license. 
 
Some scholars may question the homogeneity assumption. But this is true for the case of 
selling transportation license, for example, from Oxford to London. Even in the 3G 
license auction, we also have evidence that similar slots are very similar and thus 
generate very close revenue. So this assumption is reasonable and we should feel 
comfortable with it. 
 
Assumption 3 : All N potential buyers’ costs are subject to constant return to scale. 
Buyer  i  has marginal cost (also average unit cost under constant return to scales 
assumption)  i c , which h ere is buyer  i ’s type, is drawn from the independent and 
identical uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1, i.e.,  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ i c  for bidder  N i˛ .  i c  is 
buyer i ’s private knowledge, but the distribution of it is common knowledge.  
 
Remark: This assumption is quite standard, yet not without its problem. The cost 
symmetry assumption will be appropriate if the government is going to issue licenses to 
a new market. In many utilities industry, there exists usually some incumbent, thus the 
symmetry assumption of cost distribution across all bidders may not be very 
appropriate.  
 
Assumption 4 : The market demand is linear. Specifically, it can be written as 
pkQ =-. Furthermore, market demand is common knowledge.  k, a parameter 
characterizing market size, is sufficient large such that all problem we considered later 
have interior solutions. There is no uncertainty about demand. 
   11 
Remark: This assumption is mainly for tractability and simplicity. The specific form of 
demand curve comes from the fact that there is a one-one mapping between any two 
linear demand functions. For any linear demand function, we can always transform it to 
the specific form we assumed.  
 
 Assumption 5: All bidders are risk-neutral. They care only for the expected profit they 
can make if they win a license. Buyer  i ’s valuation of license is his conditional 
expected profit given he enters the market, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) max,
jj
i
iciiciii s vEcIEcsI pp ”= , 
where  I is the information revealed at the first stage license auction,  i s  is buyer  i ’s 
strategy, which can be either quantity or price. All bidders know what kind of game they 
will play if they win a license.  
 
Remark: This is also a quite standard assumption. The assumption of exogenously 
given form of the post-bid game is fairly standard in the IO literature. However, whether 
the Cournot game or the Bertrand will be played in the post-bid competition may be 
endogenously determined rather than exogenously given.  
 
Assumption 6: There is no entry cost or reserve price. 
Remark: No entry cost is only for convenience and simplicity here, yet not without 
reason. Basically, entry cost plays a role to block the entry of those high cost bidders. 
We can always normalize the highest cost type of entrant to be the highest cost type in 
our setting, so the main result will not be changed due to this simplification.  The no-
reserve-price assumption is based on its equivalence to entry cost and on the fact that in 
the practical auction design, it is very difficult to set an appropriate reserve price. This 
can be seen from the European 3G license auction. 
 
Now we turn to the analysis of the model. We will find out bidders’ bidding strategies in 
different licenses auction scheme and different post-bid product market competition.  
   12 
3. The Analysis 
 
As the existence of competition in the product market and different game played in the 
product market will end up with different expected profit thus affect bidders’ valuation 
of license and their bid in the first stage license auction game, it is very likely that this 
impact will change the revenue equivalence result. As this is a dynamic game, we 
analyze first license-winning bidders’ competition in the product market, and then we 
will consider their bidding strategies in the first stage bidding game and the 
governments’ optimal selling scheme. We will consider the Cournot game and the 
Bertrand game separately. 
 
3.1 Cournot Quantity Competition in The Product Market  
   
In the Cournot game, two licenses winners will set their quantity simultaneously, 
holding each other’s quantity constant. The optimal quantity depends on their cost type 
and the information released in the bidding game. Different first stage bid game will 
produce different information to the winners, so affect their quantity decision. We 
consider the case of an English auction in the bid game first.  
 
A. ENGLISH AUCTION 
 
Here, we consider the Japanese style ascending auction. At the right beginning, the price 
of license is set to zero and all bidders raise their hand. Then price goes up step by step, 
bidders quit when the price reaches their expected valuation of the license. The auction 
will end when there are only two bidders remained.  
 
Let two winners be bidder i and j , and their cost be  i c  and  j c  respectively. Let the last 
quit bid be  ( ) bbc = , suppose at the moment that it has inverse function, and denote   13 
( )
1() cbbc
- = . Both bidders know that, each other’s cost is drawn from the conditional 
identical independent ( i.i.d) uniform distribution from 0 to  c . Let  ( ) jj Fccc £  
( ( ) ii Fccc £ ) denote bidder  i ( j )’s belief about  j ’s ( i ’s) cost. Then bidders  
i and j ’s profit are respectively, 




cckqqccqdFccc p ”---£ ￿ , 
and 




jjjiijjij q cckqqccqdFccc p ”---£ ￿ .                               (1) 
 
First of all, we establish the following lemma. 
 
LEMMA 1: In the product market, the expected profit is a non-increasing function of 
license winner’s cost and non-decreasing function of the final quit bid in the first stage 
license auction. Mathematically, we have:  
























PROOF: From (1), we know that 




iiijjiijj q cckqqccqdFccc p ”---£ ￿ . 
The envelope theorem implies that, 












¶ ￿ ,                                           (2) 




qcccq p ˛ . So we proved part (1.a). 
Now we prove part (1.b). To see this, noticing that  
 




iiijjiijj q cckqqccqdFccc p ”---£ ￿    14 




iiiijjjj q kqcqqqcdFccc ---£ ￿ ,                                  (3) 
differentiating it with respect to  i q  and let it equal to zero, as sufficient large k 
guarantees the existence of interior solution, we have  
( ) ( )
0 2
c
iijjjj qkcqcdFccc =--£ ￿ . 
 
By same token, we have 
( ) ( )
0 2
c
jjiiii qkcqcdFccc =--£ ￿ . 
Naturally, we look for symmetric reaction function. Furthermore, the quadratic from of 
profit function implies that the reaction function must be linear. To find out the reaction 
function, we can use the undetermined coefficient method. Assume that  ii qc ab =+  




c a =+  and 
1
2






qcc =+- ,                                                                                               (4) 






cccc p ￿￿ =+- ￿￿
Łł
.                                                                         (5) 
Similarly for bidder  j . 














, hence the proof of part 





k bbcccc p ￿￿ ===- ￿￿
Łł
, i t is indeed a 
monotonic function of c . 
 
What implied by lemma 1 is straightforward. The intuition behind it is that, the more 
efficient the bidders are, the more valuable the licenses to them; the higher the quit bid,   15 
the more efficient the other winning rivals are, so the less valuable the license to the 
bidder. 
 
In the Japanese auction, when the bid goes up, the corresponding  c  is getting lower and 
lower. For the last quit bidder, the on-going bid must be equal to his expected profit if 






k cccc p ￿￿ =+- ￿￿
Łł
. As he is the last bidder, his cost must be equal to  c . 










k c ￿￿ - ￿￿
Łł
. As the 
last bid must be equal to the last quit bidder’s expected, we must have 






bbccccc p ￿￿ ====- ￿￿
Łł
,                                                              (6) 
which is obviously a non-increasing function of cost.  
 
As the government is going to sell two licenses, so the last quit bid will be the expected 
profit of the third lowest cost bidder if he wins. As the third lowest cost has density 
function ( ) ( ) ( )






, the governments’ expected revenue from each 












- ￿￿ =-- ￿￿ - Łł ￿  
        =







.                                                             (7) 
 
We summarize the above analysis as the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: If the licenses seller chooses an ascending English auction, and the 
license winners will play the Cournot quantity game in the product market, then   16 




bcc ￿￿ =- ￿￿
Łł
;  
     (2.b) The seller’s  expected revenue from each of license will be 
E ER =









In the English auction, when the bidding price increases, there are two factors affect 
those still staying bidders’ bidding strategy. On the one hand, the increase of bid means 
less net surplus for him if he wins, we called this effect direct effect, which is common 
to all kind auction. On the other hand, the increase of bidding is in fact a signal to all 
still remaining bidders, which implies rivals will be more competitive, and the value of 
license will be even smaller, so all bidders have to take account of this effect, which we 
called indirect effect.  
 
REMARK: In the perfect information Cournot game, if there are two firms compete in 
the product market, then it is easy to find out that bidder  i ’s optimal quantity reaction 























respectively. So the proposition 2.2 simply says in the 
ascending English license auction followed by the Cournot competition in the product 





rather than  i c . This is because an ascending English provides bidders opportunities to 
update their information; the increase of bids implies competitors will be more strong 
even if them win, so all bidders will on average regard competitors be more competent. 
 
                                                 









ij kcc -+ ￿￿
= ￿￿
Łł
, so we get 
3
4
ji cc = .   17 
 
B. FIRST-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
 
 
In the first price sealed auction, every bidder submits his bid to the seller and the seller 
chooses 2 bidders who have offered the two highest prices as the licenses winners, each 
of them pay what they bid.  In this case, the seller can choose to announce or not, after 
he received all bid, the submitted bids.  This decision on whether or not to reveal 
information about bid may affect bidders’ valuation thus their bidding decision. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume here the seller hide the information about the bid and 
inform bidders only whether he win or lose. In this case, for a typical bidder with cost 
i c , if he wins a license, then his updated  belief about another winner’s cost is a 
conditional Bayesian distribution, which can be shown to be 
      
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )


























£ ￿ -+- ￿
￿ Øø - ￿￿ - - ￿ Œœ +-<£ ￿￿ ￿ -+--+-- Œœ Łł ºß ￿
          (8) 
This distribution comes from the following facts. The probability of  i c  is one of two 




-- -+-- , the first part of which is 
the probability of  i c  being the lowest cost type, and the second part is the probability of 
i c  being the second lowest type. So bidder  i  ‘s belief about the other winner’s cost 
being lower than his is  
( ) ( )















.   18 
Given this belief, the other winner  j ’s cost is uniformly distributed on  [ ] 0, i c . Thus we 
get the conditional distribution of the other winner’s cost, given bidder i  with cost  i c  is 
one of the winners, 
( ) ( )

















Simplifying it, we get,  
( )









On the other hand, winner  j ’s cost may be higher than winner  i ’s cost, that is, 
1 ij cc <£ , this happens with probability  ( )















. Besides, in this 
case, the conditional probability of  ij ccc <£  is  














£==->==- ￿￿ - Łł
.  
Here  ( ) Pr ￿￿  represents conditional probability,  ( ) 1 c  represents the lowest cost type of all 
bidders. So for any  01 c ££, the conditional probability of  j cc £ , given bidder  i with 
cost  i c  is one of winners, is 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )


























£ ￿ -+- ￿
￿ Øø - ￿￿ - - ￿ Œœ +-<£ ￿￿ ￿ -+--+-- Œœ Łł ºß ￿
 
Hence the conditional distribution (8). 
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For the winner with cost  i c , his expected profit from the product market given he wins a 
license is, 





icijiijjiiji q cEcckqqccqdcccwin pp ==---< ￿ .            (9) 
Differentiating it with respect to  i q , and equalising it to 0, we have 
  ( ) ( )
1
0 20 iijjji kqcqcdFccwin ---= ￿ .                                                            (10) 
Similarly, for the winner with cost  j c , we have the first order condition 
( ) ( )
1
0 20 jjiiij kqcqcdFccwin ---= ￿ .                                                            (11) 
From (10) and (11), we know there is a symmetric solution. So we can find out the 
solution of the following integral equation 
( ) ( ) { } ( )
1
0 20 kqxxqtdFtxtypeofwinner ---˛--= ￿ ,                                                   
which can be rewritten as 






qxkxqtdFtxtypeofwinnerx =--˛--"˛ ￿ .             (12) 
Furthermore, we can also prove it has unique solution.  
 
To see this, we firstly give out the following lemma. 
 
LEMMA 3: Given an integral equation  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
b
a xxxttdt ywlmy =+ ￿ ,                                                                    (13) 
where  ( ) x w  is a known continuous function defined on  [ ] , ab,  ( ) , xt m  is a known 
continuous function defined on  [ ]
2 , ab , then when  l  is sufficiently small (l  is a 
constant here),   ( ) x y  has a unique continuous solution on [ ] , ab. 
8 
PROOF: See Wang, Zhou, Zhu and Wang (1978). 
 
                                                 
8 See Wang (1987), page 79.   20 
Let  ( ) ( )
1
2
xkx w =- ,  1
2
l = ,  [ ] [ ] ,0,1 ab = , ( ) ( ) xqx y = ,  ( ) , xtdtdF m = , then from 
lemma 3, we know that equation (12) has a unique solution. Besides, differentiating 
(12), we find that  ( ) 0 qx ¢ <  
 
 
Now we have the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: (4.a) There is a unique symmetric solution in the first-price sealed 
bid auction followed by the Cournot quantity competition. (4.b) The bidders’ optimal 
production level is a decreasing function of their cost type; the expected profit is also a 











 (4.b) implies that in a first-price sealed bid auction followed by the Cournot quantity 
competition, the licenses will go to the most efficient bidders. This is a very nice 
property, which guarantees the allocation efficiency. 
 
To find out bidders’ explicit bidding function and compare seller’s expected revenue 
under two different auction formats, we must solve integral equation (12), then find out 
expected profit as a function of cost. However, to give an analytical solution of integral 
equation (12) will be very cumbersome.  Lemma 3 implicitly gives us a way to find the 
approximate solution of the integral equation (12). After we solve out  ( ) qx from (12), 
we can solve out bidders’ bidding strategies in the first-price sealed bid auction and then 
compare the expected revenue with the expected revenue under the ascending English 
auction. Since this involves only calculation, there is no much point to pursuit this 
further in detail.  
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3.2. Bertrand Price Competition in The Product Market  
 
C. ENGLISH AUCTION 
 
Follow the same method used in the Cournot game case above, let  c denote the last quit 
bidder’s cost type, then the two license winners’ cost must be drawn from the uniform 
distribution from 0 to  c . Let two license winners be bidder  i  and  j  with cost  i c  and 
j c . In the product market with Bertrand price competition, bidder  i will win the price 
cutting competition if and only if his cost is lower than bidder  j ’s cost, which happens 







<= . Furthermore, given bidder  i wins, his 










- ￿ .                                                                                 (14) This is 
because, in the Bertrand game, the price-cutting competition will push the market price 
down to level of the bidder  j’s cost. The market demand then will be  j qkc =-. Also, 




bidder  i ’s expected profit from the Bertrand price competition is 
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At the beginning of the English auction,  0 1 c = , so for a typical bidder with cost  i c , his 




ii kcc =--- . Now suppose that the bid goes 
up a little bit from 0 to  e, what will happen?   22 
 
First of all, all bidders with valuation less than  e will quite immediately, as they can not 
make positive profit even if they win a license, so there is no point to stay on. Put it 




kcc e ---£  will quit. 




kcc ---  around  1 c = , we get 




ckc pe »--£ .                                                                              










.                                                                                             (16) 
Since all bidders with cost greater than  1 c  will quit immediately, all remaining bidders 
will adjust their belief about all other remaining bidders’ cost distribution accordingly. 
What will happen now? Now all remaining bidders know that all other remaining 
bidders’ cost are drawn from the uniform distribution ranging from 0 to  1 c , for a typical 
remaining bidder with cost  i c , his expected valuation of license is 









=--- .                                                          (17) 









e ---£  will quit the 
competition, as they can not make any money even if they win a license. Taking Taylor 
expansion around  1 c , we have 
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.                                                                                          (19)   23 
(19) simply says any bidder with cost greater than  2 c  will quit the auction following the 
first quit flow of bidders with cost greater than  1 c . All remaining bidders after the 
second quit flow will adjust their belief about all other remaining bidders cost 
distribution again. Their new belief is that all remaining bidders must have cost type 
drawn from  [ ] 2 0,c . 
 
Repeating the above procedure, we get a series of  12 0 m ccc >>>>‡ LL , until there 
are only two remaining bidders, the bidding game will end, and the government will 
raise revenue of  e. All bidders except the two lowest cost type bidders will quit the 
bidding game sequentially. So we get a dramatic result, which we summarize as the 
following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 5 :  In an ascending English auction with license winners play the 
Bertrand price competition in the product market, all bidders except the two lowest cost 
type bidders will quit sequentially after the bid goes up a little bit above 0; license will 
be allocated to the most efficient bidders, but the government will raise almost no 
money from selling licenses.  
 
This result is extraordinary in terms of the revenue raised in this scheme. Similar results 
can be found in Klemperer (1998), where he find that in the ‘Almost-common value’  
environment, bidders with a tiny advantage will bid much more aggressively than tiny 
disadvantage bidders. Here tiny disadvantage bidders quit very quickly after a small 
increase of bid. The underlying rationale behind these two phenomenon are same, which 
is basically that, as all bidders are  fully rational, they will keep introspecting and  
correctly adjust their belief and make right bidding decision. 
 
 
D. FIRST-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
   24 
In a first price sealed bid auction, if bidder i is told he wins a license after submitting 
his bid, then his updated belief about another winner’s cost is same as in (8), that is 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
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Bidder   i’s expected profit is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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,                   (20) 
which is a decreasing function of  i c , as the denominator increases with  i c  and the 
numerator decrease with  i c , this property guarantees the monotonicity of  ( )
B
i i vc . 
 
Being one of winner implies that the cost is one of two lowest cost among all bidders. 
Let  ( ) ii Gc denote the winning probability of bidder with cost type  i c , then we know 




-- Øø =-+- ºß . Bidder i’s surplus when reporting c is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
BBB
iiiiii SccvcbcGc Øø =- ºß .                                                                 (21) 
The envelope theorem implies, 











.                                                                                    (22) 
Integrating, we have   25 
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So the bidding function will be, 
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B ERvx =￿ ( ) ( )






,                                                         (25) 
where ( )
B vx  is given by (20). 
 
Though this equation is very complicated, but we need not to know the exact result to 
compare it with the expected revenue from an ascending English auction, which 
generates revenue of zero. As the expected revenue from a first-price sealed bid auction 
in this case is strictly greater than zero, we thus have the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 6 : If license-winners are going to play the Bertrand price-cutting 
competition in the product market, then in the first stage license bidding game, the 
government should choose a first-price sealed bid auction rather than an ascending 
English auction. In particular, if the government adopt an ascending English auction, 
then the expected revenue raised from license is close to zero. 
 
The similar analysis can be found in  Klemperer (1998; Bulow and Klemperer (1999). 
The main idea in their work is that tiny asymmetry across bidders may give rise to 
dramatic different results. In Bulow and Klemperer (1999), they studied a model of the 
generalized war of attrition, the main result obtained there is the so-called ‘instant 
sorting’ proposition which states that all players will quit at time zero instantly except 
one  more bidder than the number of prizes.  Klemperer (1998) shows that , in an 
ascending English auction, a bidder with slight advantage will f ind it optimal, by 
retrospective, to overbid his rivals who is in a slightly disadvantage position, while rival   26 
will never gain by bid more than his value. On the other hand, first-price sealed bid 
auction will not provide any bidders such chance to update their information. Thus the 
result will be very close to the case where there is no such asymmetry. The conclusion is 
that a first-price sealed bid auction is better than an ascending English auction for 
sellers.  
 
While our results are similar to these findings, the rationales behind them are different.  
Our findings depend on the post-bid competition. The zero revenue result only occurs in 
the case of an ascending English auction followed by the Bertrand price competition 
between license-winners.  The furious competition in the post-bid game makes all 
bidders predict correctly that the expected profit will be low, and more importantly, the 
ascending English auction enable them to update their beliefs and thus all but two 
lowest cost bidders will quit the bid sequentially.  
    
 
In the analysis above, we assume constant return to scale. Under this assumption, we 
can find out that allocation efficiency is easily satisfied, as the licenses always go to the 
bidders with lowest costs. However, in the utilities industry, the cost structure has often 
been characterized by increasing return to scale. This fact has two effects. On the one 
hand, it may change their post-bid strategy given they enter into the licensed market. On 
the other hand, it may also influence their possibility of winning license and entering 
into the licensed market. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
 
4. Cost Structure and Efficiency 
 
A characteristic of public utility industries is that they usually require high-level sunk 
investment and  display increasing return to scale. How it affect the allocation 
efficiency? We examine this question now. 
   27 
From the analysis in the section 2.3, we find that the bidding function is decreasing with 
bidders’ cost type in either ascending English auction or first-price sealed bid auction. 
This finding ensures allocation efficiency of license auction, as bidder with the lowest 
cost will submit the highest bid in the auction. So efficiency is not a problem in the case 
where there is no sunk cost investment. 
 
However, if entering into the market requires huge sunk investment, things will be 
different. Let us check what will happen in this case. 
 
To see this, let  i F  be bidder i’s fixed sunk cost. As this is sunk cost, it will not change 
the post-bid competition and hence not the bidders’ expected profit (gross of sunk cost) 
from entering into the market, and thus the expected valuation of license. Accordingly, 
it will not change all bidders’ bidding strategy. However, ex ante, a typical bidder with 
cost  i c  will make expected profit from winning a license9  
( ) ( ) , iiiiii vcFcF p =- .                                                                                       (26) 
 
If any license-winners will iccur same sunk cost, i.e.,  i FF = , then 
( ) ( ) , iiiii vcFcF p =- . 
As in this case, the bidder with lowest cost has the highest valuation,  ( ) , iii vcF, so the 
license will go to those bidder who have lowest costs. Allocation efficiency is 
guaranteed again in this case. If the sunk cost is heterogeneous, then the story will be 









( ) , iii vcF will be a monotonically decreasing function of cost  i c , and again, allocation 
efficiency is not a problem.  
 
                                                 
9 As our study shows that first-price sealed bid dominates ascending English auction, we assume the seller 
will use first-price sealed bid auction to sell the license. Also, we assume the post-bid competition will be 
the Cournot competition for simplicity. Same conclusion can be easily found for the Bertrand case.   28 
However, if the sunk cost   i F  is decreasing with marginal cost, which is more likely the 
case, then   ( ) , iii vcF will not be a monotonic function of marginal cost anymore. In this 
case, we have to consider allocation problem. And it may happen that the lowest 
marginal cost bidder can not win a license due to its relatively higher fixed cost. We 
summarize the analysis above as the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 7 :  Sunk cost may or may not affect the allocation efficiency of 
license auction, depending on how sunk cost changes with marginal cost: 
      (7.a) If the sunk costs are symmetric or non-decreasing with marginal cost, then 
license will still go to the bidder with lowest marginal cost. Allocation efficiency is 
guaranteed in this case. 
      (7.b) If the sunk costs are asymmetric and they are decreasing with marginal cost, 
then license may or may not go to the bidder with lowest marginal cost.
10 In this case, 
government may need to take some action to intervene with it to guarantee allocation 
efficiency.  
 
This proposition raises the interesting question of how to sell the licenses and whether 
the government should ‘level the playing field’. If the government cares only the 
revenue, then the case (7.b) is just a variation of irregular cases considered in 
MyersonMyerson (1981) and we can use the optimal auction method developed there. If 
we are interested in the social welfare, then the best policy is to assist ‘entry’ or to 
subsidize all bidders’ sunk cost investment.   In practice, the incumbent in utilities 
industry may have advantage of established network and thus need to invest much less 
in sunk cost investment if they win licenses. On the other hand, the new entrant may 
have to spend huge money to set up their new network. In this case, even if the potential 
entrant has operation (marginal) cost advantage; he may not be able to win a license due 
to the sunk cost investment expenditure. This point can explain why government should 
assist entry in certain circumstances.  
                                                 
10 This point is actually very close to Che’s study of multidimensional auction design problem. For 





We h ave studied how the auction format affects the potential license holders’ belief 
through the bidding process and how this information changes their evaluation of 
license and thus their bidding strategy. We discuss separately different auction format 
followed by different post-bid competition.  
 
In the case where licenses winners are going to play the Cournot game in the post-bid 
market, I have showed that there is a unique symmetric solution in the post-bid market. 
Furthermore, the quantity and the expected profit are both decreasing function of cost 
type, which guarantees the allocation efficiency. However, I failed to give an explicit 
solution thus failed to compare the expected revenue for the seller under an ascending 
English auction and a first-price sealed bid auction. This problem is mainly due to the 
complexity of the integral equation (12). 
 
In the case where licenses winners are going to play the Bertrand game, things are more 
interesting. The basic finding here is that a first-price sealed bid auction generate higher 
expected revenue than an ascending English auction. The reason is simple, and also very 
similar to Milgrom’s argument (Milgrom and Weber (1982)). An ascending English 
auction enables all bidders to update their belief and adjust their evaluation of license 
continuously. The only difference from Milgrom’s argument is that, in his model, one’s 
good news is also good news for his rival, so higher bid of others makes all other bidder 
to bid higher. In the story told in this chapter, one’s good news is bad news for his rival, 
so higher bid of others makes all other bidder to bid lower.  
 
In the first-price sealed bid auction, all bidders are not able to update their belief and 
evaluation of license. So on average, from the perspective of government who want to   30 
raise more money, a first-price sealed bid auction is better than an ascending English 
auction. 
 
Besides, I find also an extraordinary result which is very interesting and similar to some 
other findings. In the Bertrand competition case, if an ascending English auction is 
adopted, then the evaluation adjust process will be such dramatic that all except two 
lowest cost bidders will quit the auction sequentially. The result is that in this case, 
government will get nothing from selling licenses. Interestingly, though no revenue is 
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